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Abstract
In this paper, we consider ltering false reports in braided multipath routing sensor networks. While multipath routing provides better
resilience to various faults in sensor networks, it has two problems regarding the authentication design. One is that, due to the large
number of partially overlapped routing paths between the source and sink nodes, the authentication overhead could be very high if these
paths are authenticated individually; the other is that false reports may escape the authentication check through the newly identied node
association attack. In this paper we propose enhancements to solve both problems such that secure and efcient authentication can be
achieved in multipath routing. The proposed scheme is (t+1)-resilient, i.e. it is secure with up to t compromised nodes. The upper bound
that a false report may be forwarded in the network is O(t2).
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1 Introduction
The wireless sensor network has emerged as a promising
computing model for many applications including those run-
ning in hostile environments e.g. tracking enemy targets in
a battleeld. Since sensor nodes are usually left unattended
after deployment, they are vulnerable to varying forms of
security attacks [4]. Once a sensor node is captured, the
sensitive information stored in the node is exposed. In addi-
tion, the compromised node may be used to launch further
attacks.
Recently the false report injection attack has gained the at-
tention [10,13,9]. In such an attack, a compromised node
injects false reports or modies its relayed reports. Without
detecting such reports, the sink may reach a suboptimal or
even wrong decision. In addition, routing false reports to
the sink consumes the limited energy of relay nodes on the
routing path and reduces the lifetime of the network. Several
schemes [10,13,9] have been proposed to defend this attack.
To prevent accepting false reports at the sink, each report
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usually encloses a MAC (message authentication code) us-
ing the private key that is only known to the sink node and
the corresponding reporting sensor. In this way, only those
reports generated by corresponding sensors can be accepted.
To save the routing energy and thus prolong the lifetime of
the network, en-route authentication strategies can be em-
ployed such that false reports are detected and dropped early
in the routing path. The authentication is performed between
two sensors that share the same authentication key. The key
can be set up by randomly selecting from a key pool [10], or
creating pairwise authentication keys in an interleaved ap-
proach [13], or combining location information [9], or pe-
riodically refreshing the keys [12]. While each relay sensor
has limited authentication ability, a number of consecutive
sensor nodes can condently detect and drop false reports
in several hops.
Inthispaper,weconsiderlteringfalsereportsinamultipath
routing based sensor network. Similar as [10,13,9], we focus
our discussion on detecting and dropping false reports early
along the routing path to save energy. Multipath routing has
gained its popularity as it adapts better to various faults such
as sensor failure and signal conicts. In multipath based
routing, the source node sends the reports back to the sink
along several paths that may and may not be disjoint. Even
Submitted to Wireless Networks 22 February 2008some relay nodes on some paths failed, the report can still be
routed to the sink as long as there exists one well-behaved
path. Studies have showed that several braided (partially
disjoint)pathscanachievebettertradeoffamongfactorssuch
as packet delivery, energy consumption and failure node
recovery [1].
In a sensor network with braided multipath routing [1], the
number of possible paths between the sink and source nodes
are typically large. The false report detection is hence com-
plicatedasdroppingthemalongonepathdoesnoteffectively
stops the attack. False reports may escape the authentica-
tion check either through a different path or through mali-
cious node association. While the interleaved authentication
for single path routing [13] can be adopted, the overhead is
probably high. To address this problem, we make the fol-
lowing contributions in this paper:
 We identify a new type of attack  the node association
attack in both single path routing and multipath routing
scenarios. This attack is more severe in a multipath rout-
ing environment due to dynamic node re-association. We
elaborate and explain the attack using examples. We then
propose to defend the attack with sufcient information
included in the ACK message at the node association
stage.
 We propose a (t +1)-resilient interleaved authentication
method for multipath routing. Nodes are associated con-
servatively in multipath routing. We maintain similar en-
route authentication overhead and show that the false re-
port can be forwarded at most O(t2) hops where t is the
number of nodes in the shortest path.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 reviews the related work and in particular the interleaved
hop-by-hop authentication [13] and the braided multipath
routing [1] that our scheme is based on. Section 3 details the
problems that we target to solve. Section 4 discusses our al-
gorithm, its security analyses, and the enhancement to min-
imize per report authentication overhead. The experimental
results are shown in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Background
2.1 False reports ltering
In this section we rst briey describe the state-of-art false
report ltering schemes and then describe in more detail the
interleaved hop-by-hop authentication (IHA) [13] for single
path routing.
Ye et al. [10] proposed a statistical en-route ltering (SEF)
scheme in which each node randomly picks up a subset of
keys from a global key pool. A report is endorsed with mul-
tiple such keys and authenticated by relay nodes who have
at least one of endorsing keys. The false report is dropped if
a mismatch is found. Zhu et al. [13] proposed IHA to asso-
ciate nodes on a routing path interleavingly such that each
node can authenticate the MAC generated by its association
node. Yang et al. proposed a scheme [9] to achieve high
resilience in terms of the number of compromised nodes
through incorporating location information in generating au-
thentication keys. By periodically updating the keys with the
help from neighboring nodes, Zhang et al. [12] proposed a
scheme to minimize the harm of compromised nodes.
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Fig. 1. The IHA scheme (graph adapted from [13], resilient to up
to 3 compromised nodes (t=3)).
We now briey describe the IHA scheme [13] in which
nodes are associated and MACs are checked within asso-
ciation pairs. Figure 1 depicts such an association that can
achieve (t +1) resilience where t = 3. Nodes v1 to v3 are
nodes within a cluster with the cluster head CH. u1 u9 are
relay nodes that forward reports from the CH to the sink.
Basically, a node is associated with an upstream (towards the
sink) and a downstream (towards the source) node of t +1
hops away. For example, u5 is associated with u9 and u1.
A unique pairwise key is used in each association, e.g., the
u1 u5 pair uses Ku1:u5 and u5 u9 pair uses Ku5:u9. When
u5 receives a report, it authenticates the MAC generated by
u1 using Ku1:u5. Upon success, u5 replaces this MAC with
a new one using Ku5:u9. The new MAC is to be authenti-
cated by u9. As we can see, a report needs to carry sliding
t +1 MACs computed from keys corresponding to t +1 as-
sociation. If any t nodes in this path are compromised, i.e.,
t keys are exposed, the last association will guarantee that a
faulty report be detected because its key is still hidden. To
be complete, the nodes with less than t +1 hops from the
cluster head are associated with distinct nodes from within
the cluster, e.g., u1 is associated with v1. The nodes apart
from the sink for less than t +1 hops do not need to as-
sociate with upstream nodes since there are less than t +1
of them and they are unable to conspire to fool the sink. A
false report in IHA can travel O(t2) hops in the network.
Compromised Nodes
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4
SEF 5.5 10.4 18.5 46.2
IHA 1 4 9 16
Fig. 2. The average number of hops that a false report can travel
We adopt IHA due to its explicit and tight upper bound that
a false report can be forwarded in the network. Fig. 2 lists
the average number of hops that a false report can travel
with different number of compromised nodes. We use the
same settings as that in [10] in collecting the data for SEF.
22.2 Multipath routing
The design of different routing techniques in wireless sensor
networks (WSNs) is largely inuenced by non-traditional
factors [5] such as energy consumption, network dynamics,
data reporting/aggregation model, fault tolerance etc. For
example, directed diffusion routing [3], geographic adaptive
delity routing [8] forward packets to a subset of nodes
towardsthesinksuchthattheenergyconsumptionisreduced
and the network lifetime is prolonged.
Multipath routing schemes [1,6,11] maintain multiple alter-
native paths between the sink and the source nodes in order
to adapt to link congestion and node failures in the network.
Next, we briey review the braided multipath routing which
achieves better failure resilience and energy consumption
compared to disjoint multipath routing schemes.
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Fig. 3. The braided multipath routing.
Developed from the directed diffusion routing scheme [3],
braided multipath routing [1] maintains a primary path and
several alternative paths between the sink and the source
(cluster head) nodes. In Fig. 3, the primary path is shown by
the solid line and the alternative paths are shown by dashed
lines. When the sink is to reinforce the routing paths from
the sink to the cluster head, each node on the primary path
identies an alternative next node in addition to the one on
the primary path; each node on the alternative path only
identies one next node, in the same way as the directed
diffusion routing. The alternative paths may join the primary
path partially such that the primary and alternative paths are
braided with nodes overlapping with each other. As we can
see, the number of possible paths between two distant nodes
is large. In Fig. 3, for example, there are ve possible paths
from node u1 to node u5. Ganesan et al. [1] showed that
the number is proportional to the nth Fibonacci number if
there are n nodes on the primary path. The braided multipath
scheme achieves better resilience to node failures simply
because the high number of possible paths from the source
to the sink. We will explain next our design based on this
scheme.
A concern regarding multipath routing is that it may con-
sume more energy to route one packet from the source to
the sink. However study [3,1] shows that in a wireless net-
work with probabilistic link or node failures, it is much more
energy-efcient to use multipath routing since otherwise a
packet needs to send multiple times before it can reach the
destination.
3 Problem Statement
In this section we elaborate the two problems that we are
to solve in this paper. Before the discussion we dene some
terms that we use in the paper.
Denition 1 Two nodes V1 and V2 are directly associated
if they are associated with each other for authentication.
Denition 2 Two node V1 and V2 are indirectly associated
if there is a non-empty list of nodes [X1,...,Xn] such that V1
is directly associated with X1, Xi is directly associated with
Xi+1(1  i  (n 1)), and Xn is directly associated with V2.
Denition 3 A node V1's authentication chain, abbrevi-
ated as V1-chain, consists of all nodes that are directly and
indirectly associated with V1.
Denition 4 Assume there are t interleaved authentication
chains along the routing path, and two nodes V1 and V2 are
on the same authentication chain. If between V1 and V2, we
have ci(1  i t) nodes respectively from each authentica-
tion chain, and cj = min(c1;c2;:::;ct), then we say V1 and
V2 are (cj +1) raw rounds (abbreviated as rounds) away
from each other.
For example in Fig. 4, nodes v3, u3 and u7 are on the v3
authentication chain. nodes u3 and u7 are directly associated
while nodes u7 and v3 are indirectly associated. Node u7 is
two rounds away from v3.
3.1 Problem 1: malicious node association manipulation
The effectiveness of the interleaved hop-by-hop (IHA) au-
thentication scheme relies on the correctness of the node
association, i.e., the (t+1) MACs can be generated and ver-
ied alternatively. In the original scheme the node associ-
ation is established at the beginning stage of each epoch
of transferring sensor reports. Fig. 4 depicts the association
process. A HELLO message is rst sent from the sink to the
cluster head CH (source node), followed by a reply ACK
message fromCH to the sink. Each message contains a node
list consisting of up to (t+1) nodes that are used in the node
association. These nodes are the (t+1) nearest neighbors in
one direction of any node in the path. Hence, the list is a
sliding window of the nodes that the HELLO/ACK message
passes through.
When the HELLO message is propagated from u8 to CH in
Fig. 4, a node list grows from an empty set in u8 to a set
of i, i  (t +1) nodes that indicates the last i nodes visited
in that order. A node N nds its up-stream associated node
M by reading the head of the list. The list is then modied
by removing M and inserting N at the end, and passed on to
the next node. Note that nodes within (t +1) hops from the
sink has no up-stream association nodes. WhenCH receives
the HELLO message, it replies back with an ACK message
by forming a node list containing itself and t sensors in its
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Fig. 4. The node association in IHA scheme.
cluster. Those sensors are to be associated with relay nodes
that are withint+1 hops fromCH. A node N nds its down-
stream associated node S by reading from the tail of the list.
The list is then updated by removing S and inserting N at
the beginning, and passed on to the next node. The nodes in
pair associated in this way are (t +1) hops away from each
other.
Unfortunately the important node association phase is not
rigorouslyprotectedfrommaliciousattacks.Acompromised
node on the route can manipulate the node list and deceive
the nodes down in the path. This is serious since, due to the
varying nature of sensor routing, nodes in sensor networks
may have to be re-associated after each epoch. At this point
some sensor nodes may have already been compromised
and thus can initiate the attack to perform malicious node
association manipulation.
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Fig. 5. The node association attack (t=4).
Next we elaborate the attacking procedure using an example
in Fig. 5 where t=4. That is, if there are four compromised
nodesX1,X2,X3,andCH,theschemeshouldstillbesecure.
The HELLO and ACK messages also include a node list
with 5 node IDs. For clarity, we omit the HELLO messages
received by u3 u8 and the ACK messages beyond u6 as
they are not relevant in the attack. Ideally the two nodes in
each association pair should be 5 (=t+1) hops away from
each other.
Let us focus on X3 who manipulates the node associa-
tion. X3 rst receives a HELLO message with the list
(u7;u6;u5;u4;u3). Therefore X3 is up-stream associated
with u7. However, since it is compromised, it sends u2 a
fake node list (u5;u4;u3;u6;X3). This list ensures that u2
and u1 are up-stream associated with u5 and u4 respec-
tively while the correct association should be u6 and u5.
Similarly, in processing the ACK message, X3 forges the
outgoing node list to u3. The fake node list ensures that
u3 to u7 are down-stream associated with CH, u1, u2, X2,
and X3 respectively. In addition, we see that X1 and X2 are
down-stream associated with u2 and u1 respectively, due to
the initial malicious node list formed by CH.
After the above malicious association, the compromisedCH
can send any false reports to the sink without being detected
en-route. The false report can be constructed through the
collaboration between X3 andCH. In a false report, suppose
P is the report content; XMACP is the XOR-MAC to be au-
thenticated by the sink [13]; the rest are ve pairwise keyed
MACs for en-route authentication. Let keyX2:u1 denote the
pairwise key between node X2 and u1. The corresponding
MAC  MACkey:X2:u1(P) is generated by X2 and to be ver-
ied by u1. Clearly, if one node in an association pair is
compromised, the MAC can always be forged. Let MACx
be some arbitrary unimportant bits in a MAC.
The report forged by CH is
[ P;XAMCP; MACkey:X2:u1(P);MACkey:X1:u2(P);
MACx;MACx;MACx]
4This false report can pass u1 and u2 since the correspond-
ing MACs are generated by compromised nodes X1 and X2.
After passing these two nodes, two new MACs are added
 MACkey:u1:u4(P) and MACkey:u2:u5(P) which are to be vali-
dated by u4 and u5 respectively.
ThereforethecompromisednodeX3canrearrangethereport
and generate the new report as follows.
[ P;XMACP; MACkey:CH:u3(P);MACkey:u1:u4(P);
MACkey:u2:u5(P);MACkey:X2:u6(P);
MACkey:X3:u7(P)]
In this report, the 1st, 4th and 5th MAC can be generated
since each corresponding association has a compromised
node. The 2nd and 3rd MACs are received from u1 and u2.
At this point, all ve MACs are consistent with the false
report content. It can be forwarded to the sink without being
detected.
NotethatACKmessagesareauthenticatedhop-by-hopinthe
original IHA scheme. However, this cannot defend the above
attack. Since the node list in the ACK message gets updated
at each node, the MAC gets updated as well. The MAC key
used to authenticate the message is the pairwise key between
the current node and its immediate up-stream node [13]. In
the above attack, the malicious node deliberately changes
the node list, and thus can always generate a consistent MAC
to deceive the up-stream neighbor.
Attack summary. By observing this attack, we can nd that
node X2 sits on two authentication chains  the u1-chain and
u2-chain. This effectively reduces the number of different
MACs to t, or, it is possible to construct (t +1) different
MACs from t compromised nodes. In more general an attack
succeeds if we can associate at least one compromised node
on each of the (t+1) authentication chains. We can also nd
that it is X3 that mainly perform the manipulation, resulting
in that the attack can happen anywhere on the path. We will
devise a mechanism to defend such attacks in section 4.
3.2 Problem 2: security and overhead tradeoffs in multi-
path routing
As false reports may also be injected in a multipath routing
based sensor network, it is equally important to perform
en-route authentication and drop false reports as early as
possible.
However with braided multipath routing, there are large
number of different routing paths between the sink and the
source nodes. In [1] Ganesan et al. showed that the number
is proportional to the nth Fibonacci number if there are n
nodes on the primary routing path. The maintenance over-
head would be prohibitively high if the IHA scheme is di-
rectly applied to each possible path.
Instead a reasonable solution is to consider multiple rout-
ing paths simultaneously. To perform the node association
at each node, only its neighboring nodes need to be con-
sidered. The IHA associates two nodes that are (t +1) hops
away from each other into one pair, and uses a node list con-
taining the last traveled (t +1) nodes to help node associa-
tion. In multipath routing, we can similarly consider a short
routing path segment. The difference is that there might be
multiple (t+1)-hop-away nodes in each routing direction. It
is not trivial to design a secure and efcient node association
scheme accordingly.
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Fig. 6. The node association in multipath routing (t=3).
Let us discuss three attempts with different overhead and
security levels. The rst attempt is that a node sets up a dif-
ferent pairwise key with each of its (t+1)-hop-away nodes;
authentication is then performed based on which path the
report is routed along. For example Fig. 6(a) illustrates this
attempt with t=3. There are ve subpaths from u1 to u5,
path1: u1 u2 u3 u4 u5
path2: u1 u2 u7 u8 u4 u5
path3: u1 u9 u10 u3 u4 u5
path4: u1 u9 u10 u3 u11 u5
path5: u1 u2 u3 u11 u5
Thus u1 creates three up-stream pairwise keys  one with
u5 for path1 and path5, one with u4 for path2 and path3;
and one with u11 for path4. In addition, u1 has to create
similar number of down-stream pairwise keys (not shown in
the gure). This attempt is secure as each different subpath
5is independently protected by IHA. However, as one can see,
the overhead is still very high. In addition to the storage for
saving and distinguishing multiple keys, a relay node (e.g.
u1) has to generate and transmit three different MACs up-
stream, instead of one MAC per node in IHA. The latter is
more problematic as data transmission in sensor networks
consumes more energy. The authentication overhead may
increase m times in multiple routing if each node generates
m MACs on average.
To reduce the authentication overhead, we can group all up-
stream (t +1)-hop-away nodes together using one authenti-
cationkey.Similarly,adifferentauthenticationkeyiscreated
for all down-stream (t +1)-hop-away nodes. In the above
example, a group authentication key is created among u1,
u5, u4, and u11. Thus no matter which path the packet is to
take, u1 only needs to generate one up-stream MAC. Un-
fortunately while this scheme can greatly reduce the over-
head, the security is compromised. For example, due to the
existence of path2, node u5 also sets up a key with u2 as
they are (t +1) hops away from each other. Therefore, u5
stays on two different authentication chains (u1-chain and
u2-chain). If u5 is compromised, it can generate two MACs
such that (t +1) legal MACs can be constructed by u5 and
other (t 1) compromised nodes. In summary, if a node gets
involved in two different authentication chains, it is possible
to break the authentication protection by generating (t +1)
legal MACs from t compromised nodes.
Based on the above observation, the third mechanism could
be to allow each node to stay on only one authentication
chain. In the above example, if u5 has been associated with
u1, it may not be associated with u2 even with the existence
of the path path2. However, the difculty is that between u1
and u2, which node should be associated with u5. We may
run into security problems if we give the priority to one over
theother.Asanotherexample,iftheprimarypathisofhigher
priority in Fig. 6(b), then u1 to u4 should be associated with
u5;u13;u14;u15 respectively. However, no matter how we
associate node u12, only two different MACs are checked
along the path u4 u12 u15. In such a setting even if a
false report is detected and dropped along the primary path
u4 u5 u13 u14, it might still reach u15 via the shortcut
u4 u12 u15. If this continues to happen beyond u15, a
false report can reach the sink without being dropped en-
route.
Therefore, it is challenging to design an interleaved authen-
tication scheme that is both secure and efcient for multi-
path routing.
3.3 Assumptions
Before presenting our algorithm, we discuss the network and
attack models that we consider in the paper.
The network model We consider a sensor network that con-
sists of a number of battery-powered sensor nodes and a
sink node with abundant resources, e.g. energy and com-
putation power. We assume the sink node cannot be com-
promised. Each sensor is assigned with a unique ID and a
secret key before deployment. Both the ID and the key are
known to the sink node. Sensor nodes are left unattended
after deployment. They monitor events of interests and send
the data reports back to the sink. When an event happens in
the network, it can be detected by multiple nodes in a clus-
ter. We assume that majority of sensing nodes for any single
event are trustworthy. We assume the clustering technique
is used since it has been proven effective in reducing en-
ergy consumption of the entire sensor network [2,7]. Data
reports are rst sent to the cluster head who will construct
an aggregated report that also contains the IDs and MACs
from sensing sensors. We use the multi-hop braided multi-
path routing scheme [1]. Thus the report is forwarded along
both the primary and alternative routing paths to the sink.
The attack model We assume that once a sensor node is
compromised, the adversary can retrieve all embedded secu-
rity information including the secret key. Therefore, a com-
promised node can inject false data reports as shown in
[13,10]. We further assume the adversary knows the proto-
col or other security algorithms used in the network.
We assume that the adversary can attack the node associa-
tion phase. Since the node association may be performed pe-
riodically at the beginning of each epoch, some nodes may
have already been compromised at that time. There are up
to t compromised nodes in the network.
We assume the sink always has the ability to detect a false
report as shown in [13]. It is achieved by including the XOR-
MACofMACsfrom(t+1)sensingnodesusingprivatekeys.
In this paper we therefore focus on detecting and dropping
false report en-route.
4 Our Algorithm
In this section we present our algorithm for ltering false
reportsinmultipathroutingbasedsensornetworks.Wefocus
on enhancing node association schemes and then prove their
security.
4.1 Overview
Similar to IHA, our algorithm contains ve phases. The
enhancements are integrated in phases 2 and 4 which will be
discussed in more details next. Other phases stay unchanged.
1. The node initialization and deployment phase. Each node
is loaded with a unique id and a private key before the
deployment.Thedeployednodealsosetsuppairwisekeys
with its immediate neighbors.
2. The node association discovery phase. A node discovers
its up-stream and down-stream associated nodes. Authen-
tication keys are also generated in this phase.
63. The report endorsement phase. Each report is endorsed by
(t +1) nodes within the cluster. The cluster head collects
the sensing data and the (t+1) MACs, wraps them to one
report, and sends the report back to the sink.
4. The en-route ltering phase. Each relay node veries the
MAC generated from its down-stream association nodes
and generates one new MAC to be veried by its up-
stream association nodes.
5. The sink verication phase. The sink node always has the
ultimate ability to verify if the report is authentic using
private keys of (t +1) sensing nodes.
4.2 Detailed Description
We focus our discussion on node association since the au-
thentication largely depends on how the nodes are associ-
ated. We rst present how to defend the malicious node as-
sociation attack in single path routing. We then extend it to
the multipath based routing network.
Enforced node association for single path routing. Ideally
IHA assigns (t +1) consecutive nodes to (t +1) different
authentication chains. As there are at most t compromised
nodes, even ift authentication chains are broken, at least one
is still well-behaved. Any node on this chain can detect and
drop false reports. However in Fig. 5 with the help of the
compromised node X3 who forges the node lists for node
association, node X2 is successfully linked to two different
authentication chains. X2 is linked to the u6-chain through
direct association while it is linked to the u4-chain through
indirect association (through u1). Once the malicious node
association succeeds, the adversary can defeat the authenti-
cation by generating (t +1) consistent MACs from X2 and
other (t 1) compromised nodes. Since the node association
is short-sighted to see past (t +1) nodes, u4 and u6 do not
know that their authentication chains actually merge at X2.
With the above observation, the enhancement is clear  we
should nd a way to enforce the interleaved node association
such that (t+1) authentication chains keep disjoint. A brute
force approach is to remember the complete routing path
from the cluster node to the sink. Clearly it is inefcient and
expensive. Given there are at most t compromised nodes, we
willproveitissecurebyincludinglast(t+1)2 travelednodes
in the ACK message. Our enhancement works as follows,
 The ACK message contains nodes ids of last traveled
(t +1)2 down-stream nodes, that is, each node receives
a matrix of nodes [uij] (0  i; j  t)). The matrix is to
replace the (t +1)-node list in the ACK message in the
original IHA. The nodes form (t+1) authentication chain
while each chain has nodes from last (t +1) rounds. As
shown in Fig. 7, given a xed j (0 j t), u0j;u1j;:::;ut j
are on one authentication chain.
In addition while u00;:::;u0t are last traveled (t +1)
nodes, the last traveled one may not be u00. Instead it is
identied by the index value Ind as discussed next.
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Fig. 7. An ACK message has (t+1)2 node ids.
 An index value Ind with dlog(t+1)e bits is also included
in the ACK message. It is used to indicate the last traveled
node and its authentication chain. IHA identies the last
node by shifting the node to the head of the list. Instead
we identify its column index in the matrix and keep up-
dating the index. The reason is to help node association
in multipath routing case.
Ind is initialized to zero; when a node receives the
node list, it is updated as follows.
Indnew = (Indreceived +1)mod(t +1):
After updating Ind, the current node is associated to
the u0:Ind authentication chain.
 Each node also updates the id matrix before sending to
the next up-stream node. We do not shift the whole matrix
but instead only the one column, that is, the current node
is set as u0:Ind while uk:Ind replaces u(k+1):Ind (0 k  t-
1)). Node ut:Ind is removed from the list (Fig. 7).
 To prevent node id matrix from malicious modication,
the authentication key is generated using the node matrix
and the index. That is, instead of setting the authentication
key as the pairwise key PairKey between two directly
associated nodes, we generate a new authentication key
AuthKey from the pairwise key, the index Ind and the
common part of the node matrices at two nodes.
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As we know any two associated nodes should have the
same Ind. After routing a node matrix to its up-stream
associated node, the last (t+1) node ids should have been
removed, the rst (t +1) nodes are newly added, and the
rest are shifted by one row. The newly added node ids are
those ids traveled between u1 and u2. As a result, u1 and
u2 can create a common authentication key only if they
are on the same authentication chain and see the same
t(t +1) traveled nodes before u1.
To generate the consistent authentication key, we have
(note uij at u1 is the same as u(i+1)j at u2)
7at u1 : AuthKey = FPairKey(Indjju00jju01jj:::jju(t 1)t):
at u2 : AuthKey = FPairKey(Indjju10jju11jj:::jjutt):
where F is an encryption or a keyed-hashing function,
e.g. RC5 [10]; PairKey is the pairwise key shared be-
tween u1 and u2. u1 and u2 must be sharing the same
Ind as they are on the same authentication chain.
 Before generating the new authentication key, the current
node checks nodes from any two authentication chains
do not overlap, i.e. no node can appear twice in the node
id matrix attached in the ACK message 8uij;ukl;uij =
ukl if f (i = k and j = l).
We will prove that the above enhancement ensures that any
(t +1) consecutive non-compromised nodes stays on dis-
joint authentication chains. Now the attack in Fig. 5 cannot
succeed: u4 will reject the association as X2 appears on the
u4-chain and it is one of the last traveled t nodes.
Node association for multipath routing. Next we discuss
how to achieve secure and efcient authentication in multi-
path routing. We split the node association to two subtasks
and want to achieve
(1) The up-stream association: to maintain similar authentica-
tionoverheadasthatinsinglepathrouting,eachnodeonly
generates one MAC regardless of the path a report may
further be forwarded to. In other words, a node shares the
same authentication key with multiple up-stream nodes.
(2) The down-stream association: to ensure the authentication
strengthen, i.e. no authentication chain may be skipped,
we perform conservative down-stream node association
assuming the path with the smallest number of hops (and
authentication checks) was taken. That is, the authentica-
tion is interleaved according to the shortest path while it
may be out of the interleaving order along other paths.
Next we use an example to illustrate how our scheme works
and then present the detailed algorithm. In Fig. 8(a), we
assume t=3 and there are four v1;v2;v3;v4 authentication
chains. Let us rst focus on the down-stream node associ-
ation at node u5. Assuming that nodes u1 to u4 have been
interleavingly associated to v1- to v4- chains respectively.
node u7, u10 and u11 have been associated to v3-, v4-, and
v1- chains respectively. According to two different paths
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 and u1 u2 u3 u10 u11, u5
can be associated either to v1-chain or v2-chain. We want
to associate it to one chain to ensure security (otherwise t
compromised nodes may generate (t+1) consistent MACs).
With the conservative association policy, u5 is associated
on v1-chain, which ensures that checks on v1-chain are not
missed along any path.
The above association leaves the authentication on the path
u1 u2 u3 u10 u11 not strictly interleaved. More im-
portantly, along this path, the association between u5 and
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Fig. 8. The conservative node association in multipath routing
(t=3).
u11 has no other authentication chains in between. We con-
sider it as an incomplete round and dene
Denition 5 Given a compromised node threshold t, there
are (t +1) authentication chains. A node V2 is dened as
one complete round away fromV1 if (a)V1 andV2 are on the
same authentication chain, and along the path segment from
V2 to V1 we can nd nodes from all other t authentication
chains; (b) there is no node V3 on the same authentication
chain between V1 and V2 such that along the path segment
from V3 to V2 we can nd nodes from other t authentication
chains.
Denition 6 If V2 and V1 are on the same authentication
chain, and along the path segment fromV2 toV1 there misses
nodes from at least one of other t chains, then V2 is a dan-
gling node to V1.
For example, in Fig. 8(a), u1 is one complete round away
from u5 while it is two (raw) rounds away from u5. And
u11 is a dangling node to v5. With these concepts, the ACK
message in multipath routing will includes nodes from last
(t +1) complete rounds (including all dangling nodes) for
each of (t +1) chains. We will use the property that a com-
plete round contains all (t+1) authentication chains to prove
the correctness of our scheme.
Let us then look at the up-stream association at the node u1
in Fig. 8(b). it has two up-stream nodes u5 and u13 both of
which are four hops away. Since we only want to generate
one MAC at node u1, nodes u1, u5, u13 are grouped to
8share one authentication key. On the other hand, a node does
not have to share the same authentication key with all its
down-stream nodes. That is, u13 may keep two downstream
authenticationkeys,one(withu1)forthepacketroutedalong
u4 u5 and the other one (with u15) for the packet routed
along u15 u5.
We should be careful regarding the group authentication key
generation. That is, assuming node u13 is a compromised
node, it may try to associate with u4 as well. If it succeeds,
u13canstayontwodifferentchains.Topreventthis,nodeu4
has to know that u13 has already been on u1-chain. Since u1
does not have the information beforehand, our scheme sends
one extra message just to nd the association relationship
but leaves the actual key generation in processing the ACK
message.
The algorithm details are as follows.
 Thealgorithmcontainsthreesteps.Intherststep,theCH
(cluster head) sends a SYN message to the sink along all
braided paths. This is to decide on which authentication
chain each of the relay node should be assigned to. In
the second step, the sink sends a NOTIFY message to the
CH. Each node gets a notication from each of its up-
stream associated nodes. In the third step, the CH sends
an ACK message with the related node list to generate
the authentication key.
 In step 1, the SYN message contains an index Ind and a
value Rcnt that counts the number of association rounds.
If a node ux receives one SYN message from uy, it
identies itself as the next node of uy. If ux receives more
thanoneSYNmessages,itidentiesitselfasthenextnode
along the path with the smallest Rcnt, or the smallest
Ind if all Rcnt are the same. ux updates both Ind and
Rcnt before forwarding them further.
For example in Fig. 8(a), u5 and u6 are assigned to v1-
and v2- chains respectively.
 In step 2, the NOTIFY message contains up to (t +1)
sub-lists. Each sub-list Li(0  i  t) corresponds to one
authentication chain and contains all traveled but unasso-
ciated nodes on that chain i, i.e. they have not been as-
sociated with downstream nodes. Clearly a sub-list may
contain multiple such nodes along different paths. The
NOTIFY message also includes an index eld that helps
to identify the incomplete round. The steps for processing
the NOTIFY message are in Fig. 9.
Each node may receive multiple NOTIFY messages.
The current node is associated to all nodes with the same
index in these messages (a group key will be generated for
these nodes in step 3). We then check dangling nodes by
checking if two consecutive nodes are not on consecutive
chains. The current node gets associated with its upstream
same-chain nodes if no dangling is found; otherwise, it
is simply added to the corresponding sub-list and gets
associated later on (Line (2)-(9)).
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Fig. 9. The algorithm for processing the NOTIFY message.
For example in Fig. 8(a), dangling is found along path
u5-u11 as they are of the same chain index. Therefore in
the outgoing NOTIFY message from u11, the v1-chain
sub-list contains both u5 and u11. As another example, in
Fig. 8(b), no dangling is found along u2-u1 such that u1
is notied that both u5 and u13 are to associate with it.
 In step 3, an ACK message is sent for generating the au-
thentication keys. The ACK message includes nodes from
last (t+1) complete rounds of each (t+1) authentication
chains. Due to multiple ACK messages received by each
node, each chain is processed individually. The algorithm
steps are shown in Fig. 10.
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Fig. 10. The algorithm for processing the ACK message.
A node Ni may receive multiple ACK messages. Each
message contains a (t+1)(t+1) matrix Lij to memorize
9nodes from last (t +1) complete rounds on each authen-
tication chain j (0i,jt). An item in Lij represents the
related nodes for round j of the authentication chain i. The
rst node of each L0:j is reserved for the latest traveled
node on authentication chain j. The ACK message also
includes a (t+1)-item integer array indicating if dangling
is found in the last round of each authentication chain.
Lines (1)-(5) check if a node appears on two different
chains and alarm the attack if such a node is found. Next
we process the incoming ACK messages at node Nx. If
it is not a dangling node, Nx gets associated with Nz,
the last traveled node on the same chain. In generating
this downstream group key, we also need to use L0:Indx
which contains all associated upstream nodes of Nz (line
(11)). The corresponding column of Lij is then shifted
to reect the new node association. Nx also generates
a group upstream key that is shared with its upstream
associated nodes (line (18)).
 To generate the authentication key in step 3. All nodes
in one association group, e.g. u1, u5, and u13 in
Fig. 8(b), compute from Rcnt, Ind and the shared
node ids in their received ACK messages. That is
AuthKey = FS(RcntjjIndjjShared ids): Where S is a
secret selected by u1 and transferred to its up-stream
associated nodes using the pairwise keys.
In generating the key, a downstream node e.g. u1 iden-
ties all shared nodes from [Lij] (1 it,0 it) at u1
while a upstream u5 nds these nodes from [Lij] (0
i(t-1),0 jt) at u5.
En-route message authentication. After the node associa-
tion, the en-route message authentication works similar to
thatinsinglepathauthentication.Eachreportcontains(t+1)
MACs, each relay node picks up the one to verify according
to its Ind and the authentication key created in the node
association phase. For example in Fig. 8(a) u5 always picks
up the third MAC to verify as it was assigned to v3.
After the authentication, a new MAC is generated using
the authentication key for its up-stream association nodes
and replaces the old one in the report. The report is then
forwarded following multiple outgoing paths.
The only difference is that, since a report may take different
paths to reach a merge node, the MAC of the same index
may be different along different paths. For example in Fig.
8(b) we may use either AuthKeyu5u14 or AuthKeyu1u5u13.
We can either include several extra bits to distinguish or
try all downstream keys. Our results show either approach
introduces negligible overhead.
4.3 Security Analysis
In this section we analyze the security of our enhancements.
In particular we prove that the proposed scheme can defend
the malicious node association attack in both single path and
multipath routing based networks.
Theorem 1 The proposed scheme can defend node associ-
ation manipulation attack in single path routing sensor net-
works.
Proof We will prove by contradiction. Let us assume that
a false report can escape the authentication check, that is, it
can be routed through consecutive (t+1) non-compromised
nodes without being detected.
Let us denote the rst such routing path segment as SEG1.
It contains (t +1) non-compromised nodes v1;v2;:::v(t+1).
The t compromised nodes are X1;X2;:::;Xt.
Since there are (t +1) authentication chains and t compro-
mised nodes, we can nd at least one compromised node that
stays on two authentication chains. Otherwise we will have
an authentication chain that consists of non-compromised
nodes. The false report will be detected if any node on this
chain receives the report.
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
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Fig. 11. Vt has to meet a compromised node with t association
rounds.
The node before reaching v1 must be a compromised node,
otherwise the rst non-compromised (t +1)-node path seg-
ment would be from this node to vt. Accordingly there is a
compromised node between vt and its down-stream associ-
ated node vdt. Similarly we can nd a compromised node
between vdt and its down-stream associated node, and so on.
Given there are at most t compromised nodes, this process
can continue at mostt rounds, or a compromised node is met
on the chain. If it jumps t rounds, then all t compromised
nodes have been jumped and therefore it is an authentica-
tion chain without any compromised node. as we discussed
above this chain can detect a false report immediately.
In other words, all (t +1) authentication chains must meet
a compromised node within t rounds of association down-
stream, i.e. with (t +1)2 nodes down-stream. A compro-
mised node X1 therefore has to stay on two chains e.g. v1 and
v2 chains. From the algorithm, at least t(t+1) shared nodes
received by v1;:::;v(t+1) cannot be compromised. Otherwise
different lists are used to generate keys such that the consis-
tent authentication key cannot be reached between associ-
ated nodes. On the other hand if a node stays on two chains
with t rounds it is immediately identied in the algorithm
such that the node association cannot succeed.
To summarize, it is impossible to associate one compro-
mised node with two authentication chains. Accordingly a
10false report cannot be routed through consecutive (t +1)
non-compromised nodes without being detected. The node
association attack is defended. 2
Theorem 2 The proposed scheme can defend node associ-
ation manipulation attack in multipath routing based sensor
networks.
Proof To prove in multipath routing networks, we follow
the similar strategy as that in the above proof.
If a false report can escape the authentication check, it has
to route through a routing path segment that contains nodes
from (t +1) different authentication chains. We assume the
rst such segment is SEG1. It may have more than (t +
1) nodes since node association is not strictly interleaved
along some paths. Due to the fact that there are at most t
compromised nodes, we can nd at least one compromised
who can generate two MACs that can be accepted into two
authentication chains. This means this compromised node
should share the authentication keys with some nodes on
two different authentication chains.
In the node association scheme we designed for multipath
routing, a compromised node X has two choices to stay on
an authentication chain and thus share an authentication key
with other nodes. Regarding the u5-chain in Fig. 8(b), X can
either be u1 which is a u5-chain node and on the routing
from u5 to CH, or u13 which is a u1-chain node but not u5-
chain node. u13 is directly associated with a node u1 on the
u5-chain. We denote all these nodes as related nodes in the
algorithm and include them in the matrix. Therefore, we can
conclude that a compromised node has to be one of such
related nodes on two different authentication chains.
We next prove that all compromised t nodes must be within
t downstream complete rounds from SEG1. Since our algo-
rithm shifts the authentication chain only if the last traveled
node on the same chain is not a dangling node, therefore
the (t +1) items on one chains remembers at least (t +1)
complete rounds. In addition, all related nodes from these
downstream rounds are included. Therefore no matter how
we are going to distribute the t compromised nodes, we can
nd another path segment before SEG1 that have (t+1) dif-
ferent authentication chains.
Since we check node overlapping before generating the au-
thentication key, it is impossible to let one compromised
node break into two chains without being detected.
Therefore we should have at least one authentication chain
which contains no compromised node. The false report will
be detected and dropped immediately if any node on this
chain receives the packet. As nodes are associated conser-
vatively according to the shortest path, it is impossible to
skip such an authentication chain.
In summary, we can defend the node association attack in
the multipath routing. 2
4.4 The packet size overhead
Our scheme follows the design philosophy of interleaved
authentication approaches: each report is attached with (t+
1) MACs for authentication purpose [13,18]. As discussed
in recent work [18], when the overhead becomes a concern
due to large t, an alternative design is to attach only a portion
of each MAC. The MAC computation is still 64-bit based
such that there is no compromise of algorithm security. The
overhead is greatly reduced due to fewer bits attached to
each report, and at the cost of some space left to the attacker
to guess with higher success rate. For example, if rst 16
bits of each MAC are used, a random guess would have
1/216 instead of 1/264 probability to succeed. This brings a
performance degradation but not a security problem i.e. few
false reports may travel more hops and reach the sink. False
reports can still be detected from the sender MAC and thus
no false negative. We evaluated the performance in the next
section.
5 Experiments
5.1 Settings
We have implemented our algorithm and simulated it in a
network with 1000 sensors deployed in a 1000250 m2 re-
gion. Each sensor node has the detection range of 20m. The
aggregation nodes and the sink node are set at two opposite
ends of the region with about 50 routing hops in between.
Each sensor node is similar to Mica2 operating at 19.2Kbps
data rate, with battery voltage 3V. It takes 16.25/12.5 mJ to
transmit/receive a byte [10]. We ignore the computation en-
ergy cost which is usually small comparing to routing en-
ergy consumption. In the simulation, to isolate and illustrate
the impacts due to applying different authentication algo-
rithms, we did not consider node interference and channel
contention as these factors depend more on the environment
condition, the time interval between consecutive data collec-
tion operations, the amount of data to collect, and the time
constraint in receiving the reports. Channel contention and
packet loss due to these factors negatively impact all algo-
rithms.
We assume that the adversaries have the full control of the
compromised nodes. They may selectively stay anywhere
on the authentication chain, inject false reports, and collab-
oratively generate consistent MACs to deceive the en-route
authentication. That is we evaluate the worst case perfor-
mance of discussed algorithms. In case if all MACs match
the false content, the false packet can be routed all the way
to the sink node where it then gets detected by the sink node.
Legitimate sensors behave according to the given authenti-
cation algorithms.
5.2 The node association overhead
Fig. 12 compares the overhead to setup the node associa-
tion in different schemes. Since all schemes set up the as-
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Fig. 12. The node association overhead.
sociation by exchanging messages that contain neighboring
node IDs, we represent the overhead as the number of IDs
each relay node receives. In the original IHA [13] for single
path routing  denoted as SP.IHA-, each node receives
two messages while each contains last traveled (t +1) IDs.
Therefore its overhead is 2*(t+1)/node. SP.IHA represents
the scheme with the enhancement to defend the association
attack. In this scheme, each ACK message contains (t+1)2
node IDs and thus the overhead is ((t +1)2+(t +1))/node.
The results are slightly smaller than the theoretic data be-
cause nodes close to CH and the sink receive messages with
less number of IDs. For example, in SP.IHA the ACK mes-
sage received by nodes within t2 hops away from the CH
contain less than (t +1)2 IDs.
To perform the interleaved authentication in multipath
routing, a naive adoption of the IHA scheme, denoted as
MP.IHA, needs to create association with multiple up-
stream and downstream nodes. It has higher overhead than
SP.IHA as a node should receive nodes IDs from all paths
e.g. the ACK message contains last traveled (t +1)2 from
all possible paths. From the gure, our new scheme has the
highest setup overhead. This is because that our scheme
exchanges three messages. The SYN message contains two
values; the NOTIFY message contains a node list with
O(t+1) node ids; the ACK messages contains a node list
with O(k(t +1)2) node ids where k is the average num-
ber of different ACK messages per node. This is similar to
MP.IHA, the difference is that due to the selection of the
path with the smallest number of hops, a complete round
path segment may have more than (t+1) nodes along some
paths. On average in association phase, our scheme receives
38% more node IDs than MP.IHA.
While the overhead of the node association in our scheme is
higher, it is a one-time overhead in each epoch and quickly
amortized by multiple relayed packets.
Other cost includes the several bits in the report to distin-
guish the (t+1)-hop routing path such that a relay node can
select from multiple down-stream keys. The required num-
ber of bits is in very small and can be removed if there is
only one down-stream associated node.
5.3 The routing overhead
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Fig. 13. The number of MACs generated by each node.
Next we study the routing overhead. Fig. 13 shows the num-
ber of MACs generated at each node. Clearly in single path
routing schemes, each node needs to verify and replace one
MAC i.e. only one new MAC is generated. In MP.IHA,
since each node is associated with multiple upstream nodes,
a node has to generate multiple MACs. Depending on which
path the report is further forwarded, a corresponding MAC
might be used to verify the report. For example, on average
MP.IHA generates 3.6 MACs per node when the threshold t
is set to 3. On the other hand, our scheme always generates
one group authentication key for all upstream nodes. There-
fore only one MAC is generated at each node  the same as
that in the single path routing.
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Fig. 14. The packet size in different schemes.
Fig. 14 illustrates the the average packet sizes for different
schemes. We rst evaluate when the portion of each MAC is
attached to the packet. With more MACs generated and in-
cluded into the report at each node, the report size increases
rapidly, which results in more energy consumption. For ex-
ample, whent=4, a node in MP.IHA generates 4.3 MACs on
average, i.e. a report on average contains 21.5 (=4.3(t+1))
MACs. Given the fact that the MAC size is 8 bytes and a re-
port content is of 24 bytes, the authentication overhead (the
total size of all MACs) is about 8 times larger than that of
the content. A large packet is also undesired as it increases
the chance of channel contention. On the other hand, our
12scheme includes 5 MACs. It is the same as that in the single
path routing, and a 64.7% reduction from MP.IHA.
If we attach a portion of of each MAC as discussed in section
4.4 and [18], then per-packet size overhead can be greatly
reduced. As shown in the gure, MP.IHA.Portion has
a 63.2% reduction from MP.IHA. Our scheme gains ad-
ditional 41.7% reduction from MP.IHA.portion when
t=4. In this case, the total MAC bits for interleaved authen-
tication are 80 bits, or a 31% increase from the packet size
without en-route authentication.
5.4 False report dropping
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Fig. 15. The number of hops that a report travels before being
dropped (the worse case).
We then study the effectiveness of our scheme in drop-
ping injected false reports. Since interleaved authentication
schemes are (t +1) resilient, in the worst case there are
t compromised nodes that are separated evenly along the
routing path  there are t different authentication chains
between any two compromised nodes. Fig. 15 summarizes
the average number of hops that an injected false report can
travel before it is being detected and dropped. As we can
see, a false report travel more hops in our schemes. This is
because in our scheme a one-round path segment that has
(t+1) different authentication chains may contain more than
(t +1) nodes. On average a false report travels 23.6% more
hops in our scheme.
With the above analysis, we then compare the energy con-
sumption of injected false reports in MP.IHA and our
scheme (Fig. 16). Regarding the wasted energy of each
injected false report, we have the following formula
Energywasted = RsizeHcnt (Etransmit +Ereceive)
where Rsize is the report size, Hcnt is the number of hops
that a false report travels before being dropped, and Etransmit
and Ereceive are the energy consumed to transmit and receive
the false report at each node.
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Fig. 16. The energy consumption per false report (the worse case).
Comparing to MP.IHA, a false report travels more hops
in our scheme, however the report is much smaller as it
contains less number of MACs. In summary our scheme
greatly reduces the energy consumption of injected false
reports.Forexample,whent=5,wesave64.3%oftheenergy
with the base design.
IfaportionofMACisused,thentheroutingenergyoverhead
can be greatly reduced. For example, MP.IHA.protion
uses 16 bits and has a 66.3% reduction from the base line
using MP.IHA when t=5. The reduction is also achieved
in our scheme. However, if for example 16 bits are used
and the attack random guesses the bits, then 1 out of 65536
reports escapes the check. Considering this extra overhead,
we draw the overall energy consumption using our scheme.
The reduction is 41.6% from MP.IHA.Portion. While
the percentage is less than that in the baseline comparison,
it is still signicant.
The impacts on the lifetime of the network from different al-
gorithms are proportional to the wasted energy per false re-
port (Figure 16). The more energy each false report wastes,
the shorter lifetime the network has. The exception is, if a
false report can bypass the en-route detection i.e. due to in-
secure authentication algorithms e.g. SP.IHA- and MP.IHA-,
then it can travel up to the longest routing path in the net-
work and can only be detected and dropped by the sink node.
If the attacker keeps injecting false reports along this path,
then its impact on network lifetime is unbounded (assuming
no other schemes are employed).
5.5 Comparison with public key based authentication
We then compare our scheme with the public key authenti-
cation scheme ECC [16]. We select ECC rather than RSA
since ECC has shorter key length and tends to be more
communication-energy-efcient. Recent study shows that
with public key authentication, the computation dominates
the total overhead  it take about 4 to 5 seconds to sign and
verify on MICAz node using 128-bit ECC, or about 100mJ
[17]. It is still too expensive to adapt to hop-by-hop based
authentication schemes such as IHA. If a shorter key is used
13in ECC, then the security is severely impacted. It is not like
the adoption of MAC portion in section 4.4. Once a public
key with shorter bits is compromised, all false packets using
this key cannot be detected. In section 4.4, the MAC is still
generated from secret symmetric key, only a small number
of false reports (e.g. 1 out of 1/216) can escape the en-route
check.
In addition, ECC needs to store the public keys of other
nodes. A sensor node can either store the keys from all other
nodes, or from selected neighbors. The former is impractical
due to its prohibitive storage request. The latter (storing a
subset of keys) is also problematic since a relay node may
not have the key to authenticate the received packet.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we studied en-route false report ltering in mul-
tipath routing based sensor networks. We identied the node
association manipulation attack and the association prob-
lems in multipath routing. We proposed schemes to achieve
secure and efcient authentication, and analyzed their secu-
rity and performance. The schemes achieve similar en-route
authentication overhead and ltering upper bound as these
in single path routing.
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